I was lucky to eventually find community at FAU, but for a while, I worried what kind of life we could have, me and my cat in the Florida heat, days from anyone we knew. These worries subsided into new possibilities as I came to learn about Teresa and her cat Ptolemy, and the world she brought to fruition for a few glorious years at the turn of the twenty-first century. Brennan was born in in Melbourne, Australia and died in South Florida in , following a hit-and-run car accident late in that left her in an irreversible coma.
While at FAU, Brennan founded a PhD Program for Public Intellectuals , which The New York Times then described as training not just scholars but interpreters of diverse publics, such as environmentalists, journalists, union organizers, or museum curators. Concentrations in the program originally included gender studies, postcolonial theory, public policy, popular culture, and social movements. Roughly a decade passed between her doctorate from Cambridge in and her tragic death, but in that time she published four monographs and edited two volumes.
She was putting final touches on her fifth book, The Transmission of Affect , which would become her most well-known. For Brennan, affects name socio-historical forces into which we are born, and in and through which we must interpret. Have you ever thought about writing not for a present-day audience but for the future? What do I learn from looking through these typewriter pages, email correspondences, research plans, calendars, all this personal stuff? I wonder about my relationship to these files.
The intimacy of my access to them feels at times undeserved, or more precisely like it risks the hubris of over-identifying or projecting my own ideas into what Brennan wrote. How can I do justice to the unfinished possibility of these papers, interpreting their significance without thereby smoothing over their open-ended dynamism? Intersectionality grew out of a black feminist perspective and is concerned with situations where people are simultaneously subjected to multiple forms of oppression or discrimination.
The intersectional feminist approach is not limited to gender: it extends to racism, heterosexism and transphobia. It recognizes that a woman is not just a woman: she can also be black, Muslim, lesbian, etc.
Personal experience led her to reflect on western perceptions of Muslim women. Alia Al-Saji has devoted a great deal of time to studying the discourse on the wearing of the veil by Muslim women, especially in the wake of the last war between the USA and Iraq. In that sense, I think that the criticism that is sometimes directed against feminist theory and feminist philosophy for being useless and worthless is warranted in many cases.
JS: You also write about the uneasy relationship between philosophy and feminism, describing how philosophy from a feminist perspective might look like a masculine discourse that there are many reasons to reject. From a philosophical point of view, feminism might seem to be weighed down by political tenets that are similar to dogmatic thinking. Given that we reject this picture and acknowledge that the project of feminist philosophy is worthwhile, you still speak of the difficulties of developing thought that is both feminist and philosophical at the same time.
Vous êtes ici :
What are these difficulties? Philosophy sees itself as having no prior commitments, as being grounded in nothing other than — I mean, at least in its fantastical understanding of itself — pure reason, pursuit of truth. So you could see why philosophy finds feminism, feminist philosophy perhaps, not philosophically apt. I argue that we need to take this tension seriously. I think we should, on both sides. What is the arrogation of voice and why is it important in relation to philosophy?
NB: Stanley Cavell thinks that when we do philosophy we inevitably speak generally, we speak for others. In other words, I claim that these words are appropriate under these circumstances.
Nature and scope of philosophical feminism
Therefore, doing philosophy requires a kind of humility. But the whole enterprise is very dicey. Now you add gender into the mix here. That complicates everything. JS: You also claim that philosophical texts that bear the mark of arrogation in a particularly conspicuous way are bound to be controversial when it comes to whether they ought to be counted as philosophy.
You mention for example the later Wittgenstein, Marx, Nietzsche and Beauvoir. Could you explain what you mean by that? You can make a mistake of reasoning, or you can apply the rules incorrectly. Another option is to start with a premise, or a set of premises, that are suspicious and everything is completely inspectable and open to view.
In The Second Sex Beauvoir makes all of these claims about what it is to be a woman. Of course some people think this is not philosophical! One thing we know is that a woman is a creature that is socially inferior to a man. Her story is incredibly controversial and she opens herself to being destroyed by criticism.
- Learning From Comparative Public Policy: A Practical Guide.
- Philosophy, feminism and universalism.
- CfP: Workshop on ‘Diffracting AI & Robotics: Decolonial & Feminist Perspectives’ – October 12.
- 1. Introduction.
- The New Cambridge Modern History: Volume 4, The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War, 1609-48 49 (The New Cambridge Modern History).
- Handbook of Power Systems II.
Her capacity to withstand that and to hold her ground and to be educated by other people, I find endlessly admirable. But then again, of course I find it admirable in Marx and I find it admirable in Wittgenstein as well.
What is feminist philosophy?
On the other hand you also talk about the importance of remaining within philosophy in order to transform it, also discussing the risk of ending up outside of philosophy. In the introduction to Critique of Pure Reason he uses metaphors taken from the realm of the law. In the introduction she adds that women are, too. So in the end Beauvoir rejects the idea that an impartial judge would be of any use when it comes to the question of gender.
- Is Theology a Science?: The Nature of the Scientific Enterprise in the Scientific Theology of Thomas Forsyth Torrance and the Anarchic Epistemology of Paul Feyerabend.
- Account Options.
- Health - The Beauty Diet - Looking Great Has Never Been So Delicious!
- A feminist approach to philosophy.
- Powder Technology Handbook, Third Edition.
- Nonlinear theory of dislocations and disclinations in elastic bodies?
Yet, as you have shown in your book, she does not shy away from a claim to objectivity. It seems to me that this would be an example of the idea of working from within a tradition, appealing to, yet in the very act of appropriation transforming, our understanding of what critique ought to be. What do you think of her work in relation to the tradition of critique? Nobody had really asked this question before: What is a woman?
Then we have to ask: What is a woman? Not the best example, not the only example, but I am a woman.
- Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilisation.
- Becoming Tom Thumb: Charles Stratton, P. T. Barnum, and the Dawn of American Celebrity.
- Feminist philosophy.
- Human Rights. Feminist- and Gender-Philosophical Perspectives..
- Recent tweets.
In my opinion, the whole Second Sex is a reflection on that fact. For Beauvoir this was an astonishing fact, because she had always thought of herself as somebody who in some ways had escaped all the conditions of womanhood. It raises a philosophical question for her. Then I want to answer this question in a very different way.
Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy
Yet at the same time, not only is the judgment content subjective, but it feels to me subjective. I understand that this is my reaction to the thing and yet at the same time my conviction in the judgment seems to be a function of the object itself. I think most of the claims that Beauvoir makes in The Second Sex have that kind of status. In that sense, I think her work is deeply traditional, philosophically. JS: I have another reflection on Beauvoir and the tradition of critique. If we move forward to Hegel in the history of German philosophy, we arrive at the notion of perspectivism , in the sense that his thought incorporates the idea of a plurality of subjects with separate perspectives that are in conflict.
Nietzsche, on the other hand, perfects perspectivism and he turns it into a condition of critique. But when Nietzsche speaks and arrogates his voice, it is usually in critique of movements for social justice, feminism, socialism et cetera. It thus seems to me that Beauvoir is the first, or one of the first, to juggle the notion of oppression within the tradition of critique, as a member of an oppressed group.
Feminism and Feminist Theory | Department of Philosophy | University of Washington
Would you agree? NB: I think I agree with what you say about Beauvoir. I would want to think for a minute whether Marx was also someone who could be seen to come out of the critical tradition, not completely rejecting it and being very interested in oppression.